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INCREMENTAL AND AVERAGE CONTROL COSTS
IN A MODEL OF WATER QUALITY TRADING
WITH DISCRETE ABATEMENT UNITS
ArthurJ. Caplan
ABSTRACT

This paper answers three questions related to the discrete nature of pollution abatement:
(i) does a source's incremental control cost necessarily exceed its average control cost, (ii) is
incremental control cost a better approximation of a source's willingness to pay for abatement
credits than average control cost, and (iii) exactly how do discrete and continuous abatement
markets differ from one another? We find that the answer to the first two questions are both
"no," suggesting that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency needs to refine its reliance on
incremental control cost as the sole measure upon which to assess the financial feasibility of
water quality trading. In answer to the third question, the equilibrium outcome for a discrete
abatement market can be solved through a process of implicit sequential consistency. For the
general case where the sources' average control cost curves "cross," the equilibrium is inherently
sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities.
Key words:

discrete abatement; incremental control cost; average control cost; willingness to
pay.
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INCREMENTAL AND AVERAGE CONTROL COSTS
IN A MODEL OF WATER QUALITY TRADING
WITH DISCRETE ABATEMENT UNITS l
1. Introduction

According to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), the first step in
assessing the financial attractiveness of water quality trading (WQT) in any given watershed is to
calculate dischargers' incremental costs of control (IC) [EPA, 2004]. This is because IC, defined
as the average cost of control of the incremental reduction required for a discharger to achieve
its target load, represents a better approximation of a discharger's, or source's, upper-bound
willingness to pay (WTP) for pollutant reduction credits. 2 The logic behind this statement is that
each control "step," once implemented, is a sunk cost. If a source had previously installed a
control technology, its expense should not influence the next step decision for pollutant control.
As the EPA puts it, "if a source implements step 1 control technology and is now looking toward
a step 2 option, the IC considers only the cost of the second step of control technology; the
previous step cost is sunk and is no longer part of the decision making analysis" [EPA, 2004,
page 34].
This paper takes a close look at IC in the context of discrete or discontinuous abatement.
In particular, the relationships between IC and both the traditional measure of average cost of
control (AC) and WTP is examined. Three questions about these relationships are answered.
First, is IC necessarily larger than AC, i.e., is it necessarily a better approximation than AC of

IThe author acknowledges the generous fmancial support provided by the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency through its Watershed Initiative Grant Program.
2S ubtracting the source's target load from its current load results in the source's total reduction needed to
comply with its Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) abatement allocation.
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upper-bound WTP? Second, is IC a better approximation than AC of WTP itself? Third, how
does the process of equilibrium determination in a discrete abatement market compare with
equilibrium determination in a continuous abatement market? These questions are important
because little is presently known about IC and how it compares with AC and WTP. Indeed, if
the financial attractiveness of WQT is to be based on IC, rather than AC, it seems imperative to
understand exactly how IC and AC differ. Further, while the pollution trading literature has
addressed a wide variety of issues that relate to the feasibility of market establishment, the issue
of discreteness in abatement units has yet to be considered in any theoretical way.3
In answer to the first question, we find circumstances under which IC may not exceed
AC. In particular, when the initial technology step (stepl) is capable of meeting or exceeding
the source's target load, IC is at least as large as its corresponding AC. However, when
technology step 1 is incapable of achieving the source's target load, and the source has not
previously implemented its step 1 technology, IC exceeds its corresponding AC only when the
efficiency of its step 1 technology is large enough relative to its subsequent technology steps.
This result is explained in Section 4.
In answer to the second question, AC is indeed a better approximation than IC of a
source's WTP. This is because in the presence of discrete abatement units, AC is identically
equal to traditionally defined marginal control cost (MC). Since in general any source is capable
of being a buyer or a seller of pollution reduction credits depending upon its choice of how much
3Prominent issues addressed in the pollution trading literature include the identification of optimal trading
ratios for non-point sources [ShortIe, 1987 and 1990; Malik et aI., 1993; Horan and ShortIe, 2005; Farrow et aI.,
2005; Hung and Shaw, 2005], empiricaVnumerical estimates of cost savings with pollution trading [Fullerton et aI.,
1997; Bernstein et aI., 1994; Hahn and May, 1994; Coggins and Smith, 1993; Bohi and Burtraw, 1992; Atkinson
and Tietenberg, 1991; Hahn and Hester, 1989a and 1989b; Hahn, 1989], the roles of transaction costs [Winebrake et
aI., 1995; Stavins, 1995, Lund, 1993; GAO, 1994; Montero, 1997], market concentration/failure [Cason et aI., 2003;
Atkinson and Tietenberg, 2001; Misiolek and Elder, 1989; Hahn, 1984; O'Neil, 1983], market size [Atkinson and
Morton, 2004], banking [Wen et aI., 2005; Germain et aI., 2004; Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996], noncompliance
[Konishi, 2005; Keeler, 1991], moral hazard [Joskow and Schmalensee, 1986], and price uncertainty [Baldursson
and von der Fehr, 2004; Rubin, 2001; Chao and Wilson, 1993].
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to abate relative to its target load, its WTP is ultimately its MC. Thus, by a simple application of
transitivity, a source's WTP equals its AC. Moreover, given that IC will not necessarily exceed
AC, IC is also not necessarily the appropriate upper-bound WTP.
In answer to the third question, the process of equilibrium determination in a discrete
abatement market is markedly different than the corresponding process in a continuous
abatement market. The solution process for a discrete market requires "implicit sequential
consistency" in any "move" away from the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities. As
demonstrated graphically in Section 5, comer solutions (where one source is paid by the other to
abate the entire aggregate amount to meet the sources' target loads) are likely even when the
sources respective AC curves "cross."
Only two previous studies have addressed the issue of discrete abatement, both strictly in
the context of numerical analysis and thus as a kind of epilogue to the main thrust of their
analyses. Fullerton et al. [1997] find numerical evidence that in the presence of discrete
abatement an electric utility's compliance choices (e.g., across options such as fuel switching,
investment in abatement technology, and pollution trading) are highly sensitive to slight
deviations in the Public Utility Commission's (PUC's) "symmetric regulatory treatment" of
shareholder vs. ratepayer portions of the cost of sulfur dioxide permit purchases, the gain on
permit sales, the extra cost of fuel, and the cost of abatement technology. For example, a 1%
increase in the portion of permit costs shared by shareholders is enough to induce the
shareholders to completely eschew the purchase of permits resulting in substantial increases in
ratepayer expenditures on electricity. Thus, changes in PUC rules such as can apparently
sensitize the equilibrium allocation of abatement to the initial allocation of abatement
responsibility.
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Montero [1997] similarly finds numerical evidence that in the presence of discrete
abatement, transaction costs, and regulatory uncertainty, the equilibrium allocation of abatement
across sources (and thus aggregate control costs and equilibrium credit price) is sensitive to the
initial allocation of abatement requirements, even when marginal transaction and uncertainty
costs are constant. As we show in Section 5, the equilibrium outcome with discrete abatement is
sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities even without accounting for the
types of inefficiencies examined in Fullerton et al. [1997] and Montero [1997].
To establish a benchmark for our subsequent analysis, the next section presents the
textbook example of pollution trading when abatement units are continuous. Section 3 examines
the relationship between IC and AC in the context of a simple numerical example of a watershed.
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate exactly how these cost measures are calculated.
Section 4 provides a formal comparison ofIC and AC, resulting in our first main finding-IC
does not necessarily exceed AC and thus is not a universally better measure of upper-bound
WTP. Section 5 recasts in discrete units the continuous-unit pollution-trading example depicted
in Section 2. This section demonstrates how the process of implicit sequential consistency is
used to determine an equilibrium trading outcome when the discontinuous AC curves cross, and
explains our second main finding-the conditions under which the equilibrium allocation of
abatement is sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities. Section 6 concludes.

2. Water Quality Trading with Continuous
Abatement Units
It is well-known that in the presence of continuous abatement units a competitive WQT

market induces pollution sources to voluntarily choose the least-cost abatement allocation. This
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result is perhaps most easily understood in a graphical framework, as depicted in Figure 1. 4
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
Figure 1 shows the MCs for two sources (1 & 2), where the level of abatement for Source
1 (2) increases from 0 to 25 units going left to right (right to left). In this example, a total of 25
units of abatement across both sources are required by the regulatory authority; thus the
horizontal axis depicts all possible allocations of the 25 required abatement units between the
two sources. As depicted in the figure, Source 2 faces relatively higher control costs than Source
1 per unit reduction. Source 2 therefore has incentive to purchase abatement units from Source 1
whenever a quota established by the regulatory authority allocates anything greater than (less
than) 10 (15) units of abatement to Source 2(1).
To see why a trade in Figure 1 is mutually beneficial, assume the regulatory agency
determines that the two sources must clean up 12.5 units each, i.e., each source's initial
abatement allocation is 12.5 units. At this allocation, total variable cost of control for Source 1
equals area A, while for Source 2 it equals area B + C + D. Therefore, for this allocation total
variable cost across both sources equals A + B + C + D. An incentive to trade exists for the two
sources at this allocation because the marginal cost of control for Source 2 (point a) is
substantially higher than that for Source 1 (point c). Source 2 could therefore lower its control
cost by paying Source 1 something less than a but greater than c to incrementally increase its
abatement from 12.5 so that Source 2 can incrementally reduce its abatement from 12.5. In other
words, point a represents Source 1's WTP for the first unit of reduction obtained from Source 2,
and point c represents Source 2's minimum willingness to accept (WTA) payment from Source 1
for that unit.

4See Tietenberg (2006) and Kolstad (2000) for further details about this framework.
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Continuing in this manner, until all gains from trade are exhausted, the least-cost solution
is ultimately obtained where the marginal control costs for each source is equal. In Figure 1, this
occurs at point b, where Source 1 cleans up 15 units and Source 2 ten units, leading to
(minimized) total control costs of area A + B + C. In other words, unrestricted pollution trading
naturally leads to the least-cost allocation of abatement across the two sources, and this solution
is independent on the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities. What helps drive this result
is the continuity of abatement, and thus the smoothly increasing MC curves, as well as the
absence of inefficiencies such as transaction costs, regulatory uncertainty, and asymmetric
regulatory treatment.

3. An Example of Incremental and Average
Control Costs
As mentioned in Section 1, EPA (2004) argues that in the presence of discrete abatement
(which typifies reality), IC is an appropriate estimate ofMC when assessing the financial
attractiveness ofWQT, and therefore an approximation of a potential buyer's WTP for
abatement credits (EPA, 2004). To see how IC is calculated, we present hypothetical cost-ofcontrol and control-effectiveness data for total phosphorus (TP) in Table 1.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
To begin, note that the current loads, target loads, and total reductions needed for each
respective source to comply with the watershed's TMDL for TP are provided in columns 2-4,
which, as explained in EPA [2004], are (ideally) obtainable from the TMDL itself.5 Next, note
that consecutive technology steps are assumed to exist for each source (except for Stinky's and
Smelly's Cheese Factories, which have single technology steps). For point sources (PSs) such as
WWTFs #1 and #2 and the two cheese factories , these steps are typically referred to as "tiers"
5These and all subsequent physical measurements are in lbs. per day.
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[EPA, 2003]. For NPSs, such as Bob's Farm, these steps are different BMPs, e.g., conservation
tillage, grass buffer strips, etc.
Each step is associated with incremental and cumulative reductions achieved (columns 5
and 6 in Table 1) and the incremental reduction needed for compliance with the TMDL (column
7), which is calculated as the difference between the TP reduction needed and the incremental
reduction achieved. Surplus TP reductions, or credits, are then calculated in column 8 as the
difference between cumulative reductions achieved and reductions needed (which is zero if the
difference is negative). Total control cost in column 9 (which we henceforth denote as TCj for
j = 1, ... , m different possible technology steps) is next, reflecting the annualized fixed,

operations, maintenance, and associated opportunity costs of implementing technology step j. 6
Thus, considering Bob's Farm in Table 1, technology step 1 results in a reduction of
911bs. ofTP per day at a TC I of$49,823. This leaves 255 lbs. ofTP (364Ibs.-91Ibs.) still
needing to be reduced. Adding Step 2 technology at a TC 2 of $464,444, results in an additional
reduction of 623 lbs. of TP, or a cumulative reduction of 714 lbs. Therefore, with technology
steps 1 and 2, Bob's Farm obtains 368 credits (714 Ibs.-364 lbs.) for possible sale in a water
quality trading market.
IC in column lOis then calculated as TCj* divided by the incremental reductions needed
for compliance, divided again by 365 (to normalize to a daily basis), where j* represents the
technology step at which the source comes into compliance with its TMDL abatement allocation.
For example, Bob's Farm's IC of $4.99 Ilb./day is calculated as ($464,444/255 Ibs.)/365 days.
As defined in EPA (2004), IC therefore represents the cost per unit reduction that Bob's Farm
must incur to ultimately (or incrementally) bring itself into compliance.
6In particular, Tq equals the sum of (1) fixed cost of installing technology step jlusefullife of technology
step j, (2) annual operating and maintenance costs of technology step j, and (3) Opportunity Cost (which equals the
sum of (1) and (2) times the market interest rate).

8

IC is unlikely to be a good estimate of a potential purchasing source's WTP. This is
because a forward-looking source will always base its WTP on MC, even in the case of discrete
abatement. 7 As we show below, given the discrete nature of abatement, MCs are themselves
discretely constant (i.e., step-like) over successive technology steps (e.g., we can think of there
being successive levels of marginal control costs (MCj) defined over corresponding ranges of
abatement). Further, each MCj effectively coincides with its corresponding Average Control
Cost (ACj).8 As we also show in Section 4, IC generally exceeds ACj, \ij. Thus, a purchasing
source's IC exceeds its WTP.
ACj in column 11 of Table 1 equals TCj divided by technology step j' s corresponding
incremental reduction achieved (normalized by 365 days per year). For example, the AC 1 of
$1.50/Ib./day associated with Bob's Farm's Step 1 technology equals $49,823/91 Ibs./365 days.
Similarly, the AC 2 of $2.04 associated with Bob's Step 2 technology is equal to
($464,444/623 Ibs.)/365 days. Weighted AC in column 12 is a single measure of average control

costs, measured simply as the sum of the ACj's (i.e., LjACj) divided by the total amount of
reductions achieved. Continuing with Bob's Farm, its Weighted AC of$1.97 equals (($464,444

+ $49,823)/(91Ibs. + 623 Ibs.))/365 days, or (91Ibs. 1 (91Ibs. + 623 lbs.)) * $1.50 + (623 lbs./
(91 lbs. + 623 lbs.)) * $2.04.

7By "forward-looking" we mean that the potential purchasing source understands that if it instead chooses
to abate more than its TMDL abatement allocation it will have credits to sell.
sPor goods that can be produced in continuous units at constant marginal cost, this coincidence occurs
asymptotically. In the case of discrete goods (such as abatement), the coincidence is exact when Me is measured on
a per-unit basis. Note that if we do not measure Me on a per-unit basis, Me of the first abatement unit of the first
technology step equals Tel and Me of all subsequent abatement units attributable to the first technology step equal
zero. In similar fashion, the marginal cost of the first abatement unit of the second technology step equals Te2 and
Me of all subsequent abatement units attributable to the second technology step equal zero, and so on with each
subsequent technology step.
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4. A Formal Comparison of Incremental and Average
Control Costs
To compare IC with both ACj and Weighted AC more formally, letA represent total
reduction needed, Al and A2 represent reductions achieved for technology steps 1 and 2,
respectively, and A = Al + A 2. Assume A?A, i.e., the source is capable of abating beyond its
TMDL abatement allocation. Further, let TC I and TC 2 represent the annualized control costs
associated with achieving Al and A 2, respectively, and TC = TC I + TC 2. There are two
scenarios of particular interest.

Scenario 1
In the first scenario, we assume Al ? A, i.e., the source's step 1 technology is capable of
generating a reduction level that exceeds its total reduction level required by the TMDL. In this
case,
IC=

T~I ~AC = TC I
A
I
AI

(1)

i.e., IC is at least as large as AC I . Note from the information provided in Table 1, the three
sources meeting the assumption for this scenario-WWTF #1, Stinky's Cheese, and Smelly's
Cheese-all satisfy condition (1). In each case, IC > AC I .

Scenario 2
In the second scenario, Al <A (but, as assumed earlier, A?A), i.e., although the
source's step 1 technology is incapable of generating a reduction level that exceeds its total
reduction level required by the TMDL, steps 1 and 2 together are capable of generating such a
reduction level. In this case,IC = TC 2 I
and Weighted AC = TCI A .

(A -AI)'

AC I = TC I I AI' AC 2 = TC 2 I A2 ,
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To begin, note that,
TC
A-AI

TC
A

2 ~----=--

TC 2
TC

~ -- ~

A-AI
A

~

. h d
IC 2: Welg te AC

(2)

i.e., IC is no less than Weighted AC when the reduction needed from the step 2 technology to
ensure TMDL compliance as a percentage of the total reduction possible from technology steps 1
and 2 is less than the proportion of total control costs attributable to technology step 2. The
comparison in (2) would be relevant for a source that has not yet implemented any control steps
and is considering whether to implement both steps 1 and 2 to ensure TMDL compliance. Note
that the inequality is more likely to hold the more efficient is the source's step 1 technology
relative to its step 2 technology. From the information provided in Table 1, Bob's Farm satisfies
condition (2). However, WWTF #2 does not, i.e., its Weighted AC exceeds its corresponding
IC. A relatively high value of TC 2 ITC drives Bob's Farm's result, while a relatively high value
of

(A -AI)I A

(due to a relatively low value for AI) drives WWTF #2's.

N ext, note that
(3)
since (TC 2 I (A -AI)) ~ (TC 2 I A2)' As envisioned in EPA (2004), this comparison is relevant
for a source that had previously implemented step 1 technology and is now considering whether
to implement step 2. In Table 1, both Bob's Farm and WWTF #2 satisfy condition (3). In the
case of Bob's Farm, IC > AC 2 because A> A, whereas in the case of WWTF #2, IC

=

AC 2

because A = A. Lastly,
(4)
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i.e., IC is no less than AC 1 when the reduction needed from the step 2 technology to ensure
TMDL compliance as a percentage of the total reduction possible from technology step 1 is less
than the ratio of technology step 2' s annualized control cost to step l' s. The comparison in (4)
would be relevant for a source that has not yet implemented any control steps and is considering
whether to implement solely step 1 technology to move toward TMDL compliance. Similar to
the relationship between IC and Weighted AC, this inequality is more likely to hold the more
efficient is the source's step 1 technology relative to its step 2 technology. From the information
provided in Table 1, both Bob's Farm and WWTF #2 satisfy condition (4). Thus, while WWTF
#2's step 1 technology is efficient enough to ensure IC > AC 1, it is not efficient enough to ensure
IC > AC 2 or IC > Weighted AC. 9
Conditions (1) - (4) may therefore be summarized in the following two propositions.
Proposition 1: In the case where technology step 1 is capable of meeting or exceeding the total
reduction needed to comply with the source's TMDL abatement allocation (Scenario 1), IC
exceeds its corresponding AC.
Proposition 2: In the case where technology step 1 is incapable of meeting the TMDL
allocation (Scenario 2), IC may not exceed its corresponding AC. IC is more likely to exceed
AC the more efficient is the source's step 1 technology relative to its subsequent technology
steps.

Propositions 1 and 2 are important because given the discrete nature of abatement units,
and thus the coincidence of AC and MC, AC represents a given source's WTP for abatement
credits. In cases where IC exceeds (is exceed by) its corresponding AC, IC is thus perforce an
over- (under-) estimation ofWTP. As indicated by some of the costs calculated in Table 1, this
over- (under-) estimation could potentially be quite large.

9WWTF #2's AC 3 exceeds IC by a relatively large amount due to the relative inefficiency of WWTF #2's
step 3 technology relative to its steps I and 2 technologies.
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5. Water Quality Trading with Discrete Abatement
Units
Figure 2 depicts a stylized version of Scenario 2, as well as a discrete version of Figure 1
where the MC (cum "un-weighted" AC) curves similarly "cross" (explained in detail below). In
this figure, a total of

A = Al + A2 units of abatement across both sources is required by the

regulatory authority (superscripts henceforth denote sources 1 and 2). Without loss of generality,
we assume that

A=

( A:

+ A~) = ( A~ + A;). Initial abatement allocations from the regulatory

authority are assumed to be A~ and A~ .
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
To begin, note that Weighted AC I > Weighted AC 2 . Thus, if the WTPs for sources 1 and
2 are reflected in their respective Weighted ACs rather than their respective ACjs (discussed
below), equilibrium in the abatement market results in a "move" from the initial allocation of
( A~, A~) to the "comer" allocation of ( 0, A), where source 1 abates nothing and source 2 abates
the full amount. The equilibrium price will therefore lie somewhere between Weighted AC 1 and
Weighted AC 2 . With respect to the un-weighted average control cost measures
(i.e., AC: ,AC~ ,AC~ , and AC;), note that although source 2's successive average control costs for
technology steps 1 and 2 (represented by AC~ up to abatement level A~ and AC; up to A ,
respectively) are exceeded by source 1's corresponding average control costs (represented
by AC: up to abatement level A~ and AC~ up to A, respectively), AC; nevertheless exceeds AC: .
This is what is meant by the two source's un-weighted AC curves crossing.
To characterize the likely trading equilibrium between sources 1 and 2 using the unweighted average control cost measures, we refer to Figure 3, which is a redrawing of Figure 2

13
with pertinent rectangular areas demarcated. lo For example, areas F + G and A + B + D
represent source 1's total costs of control for technology steps 1 and 2, respectively, while areas
Band C + D + E + F + G similarly represent source 2's respective total costs of control. II
[INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]

To determine the equilibrium outcome for sources 1 and 2, we look for implicit
sequential consistency in any "move" away from initial allocation ( A~, A~ ). By "implicit
sequential consistency" we mean that although the equilibrium outcome is determined as a oneshot trade between sources (i.e., the sources do not reach an equilibrium through an explicit
sequence of trading events), we can nevertheless treat the equilibrium as if a sequence of moves
takes place, as long as the moves are consistent with each other along the path to the equilibrium.
To see this, we begin by asking whether sources 1 and 2 have incentive to trade away
from the initial allocation ( A~, A~) to the allocation represented by ( A: , A~ ) in Figure 3. The
answer is yes. Due to the discrete nature of abatement units, source 2 must incur a total control
cost of area F + G to be able to reach abatement level A~ with its step 1 technology. If source 2
were then able to sell the extra abatement units that it obtains from implementing this technology
(distance A~ - A~), the minimum payment from source 1 that it would willingly accept for the
move to A~ would be area F. This is essentially the portion of its total cost attributable to the
extra abatement units.

l°Given that abatement is achieved in discrete units according to successive technology steps, it seems most
likely that trading decisions will be based on the un-weighted rather than weighted average control costs. We
restrict the market to two sources in order to be directly comparable with the equilibrium established in Section 2 for
the case of continuous abatement units.
llIfFigures 2 and 3 had instead been drawn such that A~ < A~, j = 1, .... ,m, then similar to the result for the
Weighted ACs discussed above, the comer allocation of

(O,A)

would naturally obtain through trading.
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Source 1, on the other hand, would have to incur an added total control cost of area C +
D + E +F + G plus area 81rl(E + F + G) to reach the allocation indicated by A: (which reflects
the added cost to source 1 of moving beyond the allocation represented by abatement level A~ ),
where 0 < rl < 1 is source 1's discount rate (e.g., the market interest rate) and 0 < 8 1 < 1 is the
probability associated with source 1 not being able to trade credits valued at area E + F + G to a
third party. 12 In other words, in the absence of trading with source 2, source 1 would need to
incur the added full cost its step 2 technology, which consists of the added total control cost plus
the expected opportunity cost associated with the unused portion of its total amount of abatement
from implementing the technology. Obviously C + D + E +F + G + 81rl(E + F + G) > F, i.e.,
(5)

C + D + E + G + 8lrl(E + F + G) > 0
implying that the two sources will indeed choose to move from (A~, A~) to the allocation
represented by ( A: , A~ ) .

N ext, will sources 1 and 2 have incentive to trade away from the allocation represented
by ( A: , A~) to the allocation represented by ( A~ , A;

)?

If not, then by remaining at

allocation ( A: , A~ ) source 1 again incurs the added full cost represented by area C + D + E + F +
G + 81rl(E + F + G). If yes, and we assume for now that the two sources do not consider trading
beyond allocation ( A~, A;) to allocation (0,

A) , then source 1 incurs no added cost (i.e., by not

moving from allocation ( A: ,A~) to allocation ( A~ , A; ), source 1 does not implement its step 2
technology). In this case, source 2 incurs the added full cost of its step 2 technology represented
by area A + B + D + 82r2(A + B), where 0 < r2 < 1 is source 2's discount rate and 0 < 82 < 1 is the
121t is likely that 8 1 is a function itself of the number of market participants (i.e. , available third parties) as
well as expected transaction costs and regulatory uncertainty [Montero, 1997]. Since the determination of 8 1 is
beyond the scope of our analysis, we assume without loss of generality that it is a constant term.
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probability of source 2 not finding a third party to whom to sell its abatement credits. 13 Thus,
without accounting for the possibility of moving all the way to allocation ( 0, A) , the two sources
will agree to move from ( A: ,A~ ) to ( A;, A;) if
[C + E +F + G + 8 1rI(E + F + G)] > [(A + B) + 82r2(A + B)].

(6)

To check whether the two sources indeed have the incentive to move all the way from
allocation ( A:, A~ ) to allocation ( 0, A) , we first note that inequality (6) is actually a necessary
condition for stopping at allocation ( A;, A;) (i.e., if the inequality does not hold, then the two
sources will instead remain at allocation ( A: ,A~ )). The sufficient condition for stopping
at ( A;, A;) is that the two sources' net gain of moving from ( A:, A~) to ( A;, A;), i.e., area [C + E
+F + G + 8Irl(E + F + G)] - [(A + B) + 82r2(A + B)] > 0, be greater than their net gain associated
with the move from allocation ( A:, A~) all the way to allocation ( 0, A) , i.e., area [C + E +F + G +
8Irl(E + F + G)] - A, in other words 14
(7)
Condition (7) obviously does not hold, thus as long as condition (6) is met the two
sources will trade away from their initial allocation ( A~, A~ ) to the comer allocation ( 0, A). In
other words, condition (6) can be thought of as both necessary and sufficient for the equilibrium
13Similar to source 1's added costs associated with the move from (A~, A6) to (Al, An ' area 82r2(A + B)
represents source 2's expected opportunity cost associated with the unused portion of its total amount of abatement
from implementing the technology.
14The net gain of moving from (A:, A~) to (A~, A~) is simply a rewriting of condition (6). The net gain of
moving from (A: ,A~) to (O,A) is the difference between area [B + C + D + E +F + G + 81rl(E + F + G)], which is
the value of what source 1 saves by not having to abate up to allocation (AI, A~ ) , and area A + B + D, which is the
added cost that source 2 incurs by implementing its step 2 technology. Therefore, the net gain of moving from

(Al,A~) to( O,A) is equal to area [C + E +F + G + 81rl(E + F + G)] - A.
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outcome ( 0, A) , rather than the outcome associated with allocation ( A: , A~ ), when the two
sources base their abatement decisions on their respective un-weighted average control costs.
It is important to note, however, that condition (6) does not apply to potential initial

allocations located to the left of (and including) allocation ( A~, A~) in Figure 3. In other words,
if the initial allocation (A~, A~) had been located to the left of( A~, A~ ), rather than at its present
location to the right of allocation (A:, A~ ) , the equilibrium allocation after trading would
unconditionally occur at the comer allocation (0, A). To see this, note that if the initial
allocation is ( A~, A~), source 2 will have already implemented its step 2 technology. Thus, it
will be in source 1 's interest to avoid implementing its step 1 technology to obtain abatement
level A~ ifit can pay source 2 anything less than area B. Since it would be in source 2's interest
to accept any payment from source 1 for its abatement beyond level A~, a trade will occur and
the comer allocation (0, A) will obtain in equilibrium. For equivalent reasons, comer allocation
( 0, A) obtains for any initial allocation to the left of ( A~, A~ ) .15 Thus, the equilibrium outcome
in this case-for any initial allocation to the left of (and including) allocation (A~, A~) -is
unrestricted by condition (6), implying that the equilibrium outcome in Figure 3 is indeed
sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities.

I

sF or the same reasons that comer allocation

to the right of)

(0, A) obtains when the initial allocation in Figure 3 is at (or

(Ab' A~ ), sources 1 and 2 have no incentive to trade to the right of allocation (Ai, A~ )should that

be the initial allocation.
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6. Conclusions
This paper has answered three questions related to the discrete nature of pollution
abatement. The first question is, does incremental control cost necessarily exceed its
corresponding average control cost, as presented in EPA (2004)? The answer is no. When its
first technology step is incapable of achieving the source's target load, and the source has not
previously implemented its first technology step, incremental control cost exceeds its
corresponding average control cost only when the efficiency of its step 1 technology is large
enough relative to its subsequent technology steps.
The second question-is a source's incremental control cost a better approximation of its
willingness to pay for abatement credits than its average control cost?-again elicits the answer
no. In the presence of discrete abatement units, average control cost is identically equal to
marginal control cost. Since in general any source is capable of being a buyer or a seller of
pollution reduction credits, the source's willingness to pay is ultimately equal to its marginal (and
thus its average) control cost.
Lastly, how exactly does the determination of an equilibrium outcome in a market with
discrete abatement differ from the equilibrium determined in continuous-abatement market? To
this question we offer two answers. First, the equilibrium in a discrete-abatement market is
determined through an application of implicit sequential consistency. Second, unlike with a
continuous-abatement market, the equilibrium for a discrete-abatement market is generally
dependent upon the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities. This, in tum, suggests that
the numerical evidence provided in Montero [1997] relating the sensitivity of a pollution-trading
equilibrium to the constancy of transaction costs and regulatory uncertainty in the presence of
discrete abatement, is in fact more general than previously thought. Indeed, in the case where
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sources' average control cost curves "cross," the equilibrium outcome in a discrete-abatement
market is inherently sensitive to the initial allocation of abatement responsibilities.
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Figure 1. Water Quality Trading in the Presence of Continuous Abatement Units.
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Figure 2. Water Quality Trading in the Presence of Discrete Abatement Units.
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Figure 3. Likely Trading Equilibrium in the Presence of Discrete Abatement Units.
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Table 1. Hypothetical Cost of Control and Control Effectiveness Data. *
Source

Current
Load

Target
Load

Reduction
Needed

Bob's Farm
Step 1
Step 2

873

527

346

WWTF#1
Step 1
Step 2

917

Stinky's
Cheese
WWTF#2
Step 1
Step 2
Step 3
Smelly's
Cheese

633

410

288

72

25

47

166

Cumulative
Reduction
Achieved

Reduction
Needed for
Compliance

Credits

TC

IC

AC

91
623

91
714

255
0

0
368

49,823
464,444

4.99

1.50
2.04

l.97

662
107

662
769

0
0

378
485

2,074,237
5,222,364

20.01

8.58
133.72

26.00

506

506

0

218

6,308,251

60.01

34.16

34.16

10
37
20

10
47
67

37
0
0

0
0
20

56,032
219,022
339,450

16.22

15.35
16.22
46.50

25.13

163

163

0

55

590,906

14.99

9.93

9.93

Weight.
AC

284

698

274

Incremental
Reduction
Achieved

108

*The actual Excel spreadsheet in electronic form for this figure is available upon request from the author.
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